





Drawing on the experiences and insights of the Action for Empowerment and 
Accountability (A4EA) programme, gained from supporting local partners in 
Egypt, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria and Pakistan, we present eleven key 
messages about how to work in contexts with deeply circumscribed spaces.
 Eleven Recommendations for 
Working on Empowerment  
and Accountability in 
Fragile,  Conflict or 
Violence-Affected  Settings
There has been growing concern about 
the challenges faced by donors and 
development organisations working in 
contexts that are increasingly fragile, 
highly volatile and insecure. In such 
conditions, the first instinct of many 
external development actors might 
be to simply withdraw their staff, 
funding, or operations from the area. 
Such a decision could be explained, 
for example, by citing foreign policy or 
security considerations or by concern 
for the implications of increasingly 
repressive measures affecting these 
actors and their partners. But such a 
strategy could result in vital support not 
being provided for empowerment and 
accountability activities, precisely when 
local stakeholders say they need it most. 
If Western donors choose to continue 
to support local actors in their work 
on empowerment and accountability, 
working under the radar is an approach 
which external actors and local partners 
should consider in order to adapt to 
the exigencies of fragile contexts. It 
is essential to understand that the 
term ‘working under the radar’ in this 
context should not be interpreted as 
engaging in any unlawful or clandestine 
activity. Rather, it is about adapting to 
the conditions experienced by local 
actors in fragile contexts. The eleven 
recommendations below summarise 
what the A4EA programme has learnt 
about framing and representation, 
devising strategies of engagement, and 
understanding and appraising change, 















1. Think carefully about appropriate 
language 
Language such as ‘empowerment and 
accountability’, ‘citizen collective action’ and 
‘human rights’ might have positive connotations 
in Western academic, media and policy circles, 
but in many parts of the world, these phrases are 
imbued with less positive overtones. For example, 
‘empowerment’ simply being about earning 
an income; ‘accountability’ being perceived as 
meddling in politics; and the language of ‘rights’ 
conjuring images of powerful actors arbitrarily 
and selectively endorsing or condemning agendas 
according to their own personal preferences. 
In the A4EA programme, it has been helpful 
in some instances to use language that is less 
politically charged to convey similar messages; for 
example, to talk about ‘working together’ instead 
of ‘collective action’, or ‘creating positive change 
in people’s lives’ instead of ‘empowerment’. It 
has also helped to be as specific as possible about 
what is being advanced; for example, to speak 
specifically about women’s bodily integrity in 
campaigns against sexual harassment in Egypt. 
2. Forgo the logo and publicity as it 
could undermine local partners
Western donors are under pressure to show that 
taxpayers’ money earmarked for development is 
going to good causes and contributing to positive 
change. One way to demonstrate this is by 
increasing the visibility of this work and its impact 
through, for example, the use of donor logos; 
social media campaigns using hashtags, photos 
or videos; press releases; and often the physical 
presence of donors (e.g. visits from a senior 
politician or another representative). 
However, this visibility can seriously undermine 
local partners, who are often struggling to survive 
on at least two fronts: their governments may be 
suspicious of any foreign funding that is not being 
channelled directly through them, and, other 
members of civil society may view foreign funding 
as a form of soft power being used to advance a 
Western agenda. 
In such contexts, more backstage support by 
donors may not only be wise, but also necessary 
to avoid a backlash. In one highly authoritarian 
context in which A4EA was working, a local 
actor confided that they had declined one 
multilateral agency’s offer of support on account 
of the agency’s insistence that its logo should 
feature on their banner. Such visibility on the 
part of an external donor would have opened a 
Pandora’s Box for that local actor. 
Donors can remain accountable to their taxpayers 
by using communication strategies that do not 
put local partners at risk. Some donors, such as 
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Characteristics of fragile, conflict and violence-affected settings 
• High levels of political volatility: 
Decisions, policies, and decrees can be issued, annulled, or revised in a manner that seems erratic or random.
• Lack of clarity around who or what shapes policy in these settings: 
It is difficult to develop clear theories of change or pursue granular advocacy plans, since policy-influencing 
pathways are often unpredictable or opaque.
• Unpredictable red lines when it comes to campaigning for social justice: 
The arbitrary nature of authority and how it is being exercised makes it difficult for local actors mobilising for 
empowerment, accountability or other social justice causes to know where the red lines, which should 
not be crossed, lie. 
• Security governance assumes centre stage in people’s lives: 
This applies as much to authoritarian contexts, in which the role of the security apparatus in governing 
is excessive, as it does to contexts in which a wide array of state and non-state actors are providing or 
withholding functional security. 
• High risks to personal safety: 
Despite the glaring difference between highly centralised authoritarian regimes and those where security 
governance is being contested, the outcome for non-state actors engaging in collective action is the same: high 
risks to personal safety and wellbeing and a conspicuous absence of coherent and consistent law enforcement.
DFID, have developed branding guidelines which 
provide explicit advice on when to use their 
branding, and when it can be used minimally or 
not at all if it has the potential to put local partners 
at risk. 
In some cases, even local partners who were 
associated with an international name (e.g. 
members of an international federation) decided 
it was safer not to have their international 
partners’ branding associated with the work being 
done, because of increasing antipathy towards 
any name associated with the West. They chose 
instead to only associate the work with their local 
organisation. 
It is important not to assume that the withholding 
of external actor logos is a protective measure in 
every situation. In some contexts, it is a welcome 
signal to power-holders that local partners are 
well connected. Local partners are best positioned 
to advise on when to withhold or display logos. 
3. Do not confuse having a low profile 
with clandestine information-gathering
If avoiding high visibility involves greater 
delegation to local partners, it is important not 
to ask them to share highly sensitive information 
about their contexts, as this might give the 
impression that they are engaging in clandestine 
and dubious information-gathering exercises. In 
many countries, local activists who take part in 
poverty reduction efforts can still be prosecuted 
under national espionage laws if they are seen 
to be sharing information which touches upon 
matters of national security. 
If local partners only share their research with 
an external actor, and are not disseminating it 
locally, authoritarian governments might interpret 
their research activity as being for other, more 
clandestine, purposes, rather than for the benefit 
of local people. One practical suggestion is to 
avoid asking partners to complete country context 
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 An example of where an externally funded project displays the logos of the funders, to acknowledge their support. In some cases, it’s best to 
avoid use of branding to signal external funding, whilst in other cases, this can be useful. This is an important discussion to be had with local 
partners. The new HIV unit at this clinic in Livingstone, Zambia, was supported by President George W. Bush’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.





and volatile, it may 
be better to 
support coalitions 
of actors rather 
than a single actor.”
review reports that require them to share highly 
sensitive information or analysis, which may 
increase the risk of their being seen as traitors. 
4. Put local partners at the heart of 
the risk analysis process
Now that external actors, such as funders, 
development organisations or research institutes 
who commission work from local partners 
in fragile and insecure environments, have 
increased duty-of-care responsibilities, they are 
increasingly calling on specialised companies to 
provide risk analysis and to recommend security 
precautions. While such information is useful, 
the risk assessment should also be informed by 
local partners’ own risk analysis. Those on the 
ground are often very well positioned to provide 
information about the situation. Taking the ‘risk 
pulse’ should be done regularly and not just at 
the beginning, in the middle and at the end of a 
programme, as red lines are constantly moving. 
The reconfiguration of power-holders happens 
in an unpredictable way and some types of risks 
subside while others intensify. Without such 
locally informed and constant risk-checking, 
external actors might act on the basis of 
assumptions premised on outdated information. 
For example, because an event for the A4EA 
programme was held in a public space in one 
focus country, it was assumed that it would be 
safe to hold a similar meeting a year later in 
the same venue. However, by the day of the 
event, this public space had become so intensely 
surveyed by informants, that it was risky for 
partners to attend. With earlier input from local 
partners, this could have been avoided. 
5. Take advantage of opportunities 
to support work on safe issues that 
contributes indirectly to 
empowerment and accountability
Even in highly authoritarian and precarious 
settings where authorities display a low 
threshold of tolerance for public contestation, 
there are issues on which it is possible to work 
while advancing accountability. In all five fragile 
and/or authoritarian contexts in which the 
A4EA programme has been implemented, 
collective mobilisation around women’s rights 
has provided a pathway through which to raise 
grievances that go beyond the specific issue. 
For example, work to raise awareness about 
sexual harassment in Egypt’s public hospitals 
has led to wider debate about how to protect 
staff and patients. In Nigeria, the Bring Back 
Our Girls movement shifted its campaigning 
from an exclusive focus on the return of the 
kidnapped Chibok girls to broader questions 
about the safety of girls at school in certain 
parts of the country. In Pakistan, work around 
women’s political representation paved the 
way for exposing areas of the political system 
where greater transparency and accountability 
are needed. 
In other words, in contexts where authorities 
are sensitive about the possibility that Western 
actors might be challenging their sovereignty 
while claiming to promote democracy and 
uphold human rights, there are many other ways 
of supporting empowerment and accountability. 
While they may seem indirect, they are likely to 
have positive spillover effects. 
6. Support actors embedded in 
coalitions rather than those acting 
alone
In contexts where policy-influencing pathways 
are highly precarious and volatile, it may be 
better to support coalitions of actors rather 
than a single actor, who might be more 
vulnerable to targeting by the authorities. In all 
of the successful cases studied as part of A4EA, 
actors worked through loosely connected 
networks or strong cohesive coalitions in order 
to ensure survival. For example, the Bring 
Back Our Girls campaign had created a strong 
coalition so they could call on important people 
and connections to withstand the attacks from 
both state and non-state opponents.
7. Think of a ‘multitude of smalls’
Development assistance has witnessed a clear 
shift towards supporting initiatives that can 
be scaled up. Vertical scaling is considered a 
sign of greater outreach, influence and impact. 
For those engaged in collective action, too, 
convention has it that the larger the numbers, 
the greater the visibility, and the more likely it 
is that power-holders will take them seriously. 
However, in highly fragile contexts, there are 
instances in which going to scale represents a 
major survival risk, as higher visibility makes it 
easier for actors and initiatives to be targeted. 
Also scaling up may be seen by the authorities 
as threatening. In such settings, actors may 
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“The starting point 
of external actors 
should be to 
reflect with local 
partners on ‘what 
success looks like’ 
[in contexts 
where authority 
is fragmented and 
there is a high 
risk of violence].”
survive by staying small in a number of places, 
yet coordinating their work. Because of 
this, external actors need to be willing to 
support a multitude of small-scale initiatives. 
There is a clear trade-off here: supporting a 
multitude of small initiatives is not the most 
economical strategy when it comes to financial 
management or monitoring and evaluation. On 
the other hand, if it means the very survival and 
sustainability of meaningful local action, it may 
be worthwhile. 
8. Develop indicators of success 
that are appropriate to fragile 
contexts 
There has been a clear change of direction 
amongst those providing or working in 
international development assistance, towards 
seeing policy shifts as the key indicator of 
success. Policy successes are often interpreted as 
signalling changes in governance, policymakers’ 
practices and power dynamics – changes that 
will favour the most vulnerable. However, in 
fragile contexts, this may be problematic.
Firstly, in many fragile contexts, authority is 
fragmented, meaning that even if a policy 
change were to happen, it does not necessarily 
mean that it would be enforceable, owing 
to the plurality of power-holders and their 
different agendas. 
Secondly, for local actors to venture into 
mobilising for influence at a high level may 
be political suicide. In contexts where space is 
deeply circumscribed and there is a high risk 
of violence, survival in itself should be taken as 
a proxy for success. In other contexts, success 
may be best seen in terms of small-scale gains 
in people’s ability to demand their rights from 
local power-holders, or their ability to organise 
around interests and even just the act of voicing 
their grievances in a collective safe space. 
Consequently, the starting point of external 
actors should be to reflect with local partners on 
what success looks like, a question that is likely 
to be reconfigured across the duration of the 
engagement, given the unpredictability of the 
situation on the ground. 
9. Be prepared to reconsider the 
content of the action plan
One of the common indicators of success 
in development programmes is that local 
partners are held to account for adherence 
to timelines and action plans. While this is a 
reasonable expectation in stable contexts, in 
highly fragile contexts this is harder to adhere 
to. Space for social and political engagement is 
continually changing, expanding in one realm, 
while closing in on another. For example, in 
Mozambique, while the policy-influencing space 
for Forum Mulher, a national women's rights 
network became increasingly circumscribed, the 
opportunities for working with constituencies at 
a rural level were fairly open at one stage. As the 
political situation changed over the course of our 
A4EA work, rural outreach presented a security 
hazard, while engaging with centrally based 
policymakers did not pose the same safety risks. 
The situation is ever-changing and necessitates 
that activities and timelines are modified 
according to how the red lines seem to shift 
(both politically and in terms of security). 
10. Recognise that sunshine is not 
always the best disinfectant 
Naming and shaming is a valued and recognised 
approach for exposing abuses of power. While 
this is important for accountability, it can 
have unintended consequences for vulnerable 
groups, who could experience retaliation as 
a result of weak law enforcement or social 
norms that condone discrimination against 
these groups. For example, in Egypt, there is 
a social stigma associated with women who 
choose a career in nursing, as they are perceived 
to be in positions where they might be asked 
for ‘non-medical services’ (of a sexual nature). 
The anti-sexual-harassment unit’s campaigns 
with hospitals became aware that work on 
holding doctors and patients to account over 
the sexual harassment of nurses needed to be 
done in such a manner that does not increase 
the vulnerability of nurses to society’s prejudices. 
Supporting social justice, accountability and 
the championing of rights without exposing 
vulnerable groups to further societal repression 
is pertinent to all contexts, but especially so in 
fragile ones. 
11. Use a differentiated approach 
when engaging with power-holders
Despite a rich body of work on the 
heterogeneity of the state and the complexity 
of governance systems and structures, there 
is still a temptation amongst some external 
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actors to speak of ‘state security’ as a single, all-powerful 
entity, and one that is in direct opposition to anyone 
working towards empowerment and accountability. This 
is understandable, given that the role of the security 
apparatus in many authoritarian and fragile contexts 
is focused on defending and protecting the status quo 
and the power-holders that control it. However, the 
reality on the ground, where authority is fragmented 
and the main power-holder could be the local militia, 
is much more complex. In Myanmar as in Nigeria, local 
actors often find they need to navigate different layers, 
levels and functions of security power-holders. While at 
the national level, the state security apparatus may be 
seen as ‘the oppressor’, at the local level, it may in fact 
provide safe passage to dangerous areas controlled by 
non-state actors; for example, by supplying information 
on which roads are safe and giving the latest security 
update in particular communities. This was essential for 
A4EA’s work with Bring Back Our Girls, as we needed 
to be able to access survivors of sexual violence in 
their local communities. In these contexts, the state is 
neither ‘friend’ nor ‘foe’ and the relationship with it is a 
negotiated one. Local partners linking up with state actors 
should not be viewed either as lackeys or as opponents of 
the state. 
Caveat
As with all messages emanating from experiences that 
are context- and time-bound, these recommendations 
are not to be read as ‘rules’. For every message above, 
there will be exceptions and examples to suggest other 
courses of action may be best suited to the local context. 
They represent, however, recurring themes that have been 
identified during the first phase of the A4EA programme 
(2017–2019) as particularly pertinent for discussion when 
offering financial and technical support to local partners 
working in highly unpredictable and fragile contexts.
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